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 1 Introduction 
 
Since the end of the Cold War the outsourcing of military and security functions to 
private security contractors (PSCs)1 has reached unprecedented levels2 in armed 
conflicts. In a "world that needs security",3 the private security industry is one of the 
"fastest growing sectors of the economy worldwide",4 estimated in 2005 to be worth 
one hundred billion US dollars a year.5 This rise of the private security industry 
should come as no surprise at a time when more than six million highly skilled 
soldiers were facing demobilisation, and enormous stocks of weapons had fallen into 
private hands.6 Not even the stigma attached to labels like "mercenary", "soldier of 
fortune"7 or "dogs of war"8 could quell the growing demand for PSCs to provide a 
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1  Some authors discriminate between private military contractors, private security contractors and 
non-lethal service providers (Brooks 2002 www.ipoaonline.org). For the purposes of this article 
we shall use the generic term "private security contractors" (PSCs) with the caveat that within this 
group there will be those whose activities might range from active combat or passive defence, 
through to non-lethal support. We focus our attention on the individuals rather than the corporate 
entities that PSCs may work for. 
2  In 1991 the ratio of military personnel to private contractors active in armed conflicts was 
estimated at 50:1; by 2003 the ratio exceeded 10:1(Singer Corporate warriors; Singer 2005 
people.cas.sc.edu; Lombardi 2004 ABAJ 1). Today, contractors working for the United States 
(US) Government outnumber US troops in Iraq, and there are reportedly more ex-British SAS 
troops working as PSCs in Iraq than there are currently serving in the United Kingdom's (UK) 
SAS force (Amnesty International Date Unknown www.amnestyusa.org; Singer 2006 BJWA 
112). 
3  Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L Law 162. 
4  "With some companies employing well beyond 10 000 staff…the scale [of the private security 
industry] is a wholly new phenomenon" (ICRC 2008 www.icrc.org 5). 
5  UN Report 2005. 
6  Singer 2006 BJWA 106; Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2609. 
7  Lytton 2006 Or Rev Int'l L 307. 
8  Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 75. 
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wide spectrum of services, ranging from the non-contentious9 to those having "direct 
lethal consequence".10 While they "tend not to openly advertise their more combat-
like services" PSCs are clearly not "just running the soup kitchens".11 Their clientele 
includes states;12 ruthless dictators; respected private corporations; drug cartels; 
rebel forces;13 international and regional inter-governmental organisations";14 
humanitarian non-governmental organisations;15 movie directors; and defence 
lawyers.16 PSCs have been deployed in over fifty states,17 and in the words of David 
Milliband (as British Foreign Secretary): 
 
the private military and security company industry is essential, inevitable and 
international. It is essential because people need protecting in dangerous countries; 
inevitable, because government cannot deploy protection in all theatres; and 
international, because the market and suppliers are global.18 
 
It also comes as no surprise that PSCs have been a prominent feature on the African 
continent. Even as we write, reports are emerging from Libya that the ousted Colonel 
                                            
9  In Afghanistan PSCs (like the US based firm Ronco) were contracted to de-mine the fields so 
that local villages could till their fields (Faite 2008 www.icrc.org 1). In Iraq PSCs provided security 
to engineers fixing the sewer system, while their colleagues in Sudan flew in peacekeeping 
forces (Singer 2006 BJWA 105). In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, PSCs guarded against 
looters and collected the dead (Singer 2006 BJWA 105). 
10  PSCs have been hired to "provide combat, operational and logistical support for military 
operations" (Beyani and Lilly 2001 www.ssrnetwork.net 16); to provide air reconnaissance (as is 
the case with the US-based firm Airscan (Faite 2008 www.icrc.org 1); to maintain weapons 
systems; to protect premises and personnel; to train and advise military and police forces 
(Beyani and Lilly 2001 www.ssrnetwork.net 11); to gather intelligence; to oversee the detention 
and interrogation of prisoners; to provide security services and conduct crime prevention 
activities; and in some instances to participate in combat (FCO 2009 www.fco.gov.uk; ICRC 2006 
www.icrc.org). 
11  Salzman 2008 Int'l L & Politics 884. 
12  During the period 1994-2002 the US Government concluded three thousand contracts with US-
based private security firms, at an estimated cost of three hundred billion US dollars (Singer 
2006 BJWA 106), and in Iraq the green zone was defended almost exclusively by PSCs (Frye 
2005 Fordham L Rev 2610). 
13  It is interesting to note that prior to 9/11 PSCs were reportedly employed by two groups linked to 
al-Qaeda (Singer 2006 BJWA 114). 
14  Gillard 2006 IRRC 525; Singer 2006 BJWA 107. Included in this category is the United Nations. 
15  Bjork and Jones TWQ 780; Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2619. While not many non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) are prepared to admit their use of PSCs for fear of losing their funding by 
being associated with these "dogs of war", those NGOs operating in failed states are 
nevertheless instructed to "quietly hire" the services of PSCs (Singer 2006 BJWA 109). Many 
NGOs prefer to hire PSCs rather than to pay off "local security" or local warlords to guarantee 
their safety (Singer 2006 BJWA 110.) Controversially some NGOs have even been reported to 
hire PSCs not only for the defence of their staff, but also for the use of PSC snipers (Singer 2006 
BJWA 108). 
16  Gaston 2008 Harv Int'l L J 227. 
17  Including "Afghanistan, Angola, Croatia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Iraq and Sierra Leone" (Frye 2005 
Fordham L Rev 2619; Lytton 2006 Or Rev Int'l L 335). 
18  FCO 2009 www.fco.gov.uk 5. 
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Gadaffi hired mercenaries from Chad, Nigeria and Sudan to oppose the National 
Transitional Council in Libya.19 As Brookes explains, with  
 
the West reluctant to commit its militaries, the only way that Africa is going to 
acquire the military capability to end its many conflicts is to contract the services 
from elsewhere.20 
 
In "militarily advanced countries"21 the excess retired and ex-military personnel22 who 
have had valuable conflict experience and have few civilian employment 
opportunities provide a vast pool of personnel readily available at "remarkably 
affordable prices".23 Moreover, firms providing PSCs pride themselves on the fact 
that they "can often undertake operations faster, more cost effectively"24 and with 
fewer personnel and bureaucratic delays than traditional state armies and UN 
peacekeepers.25 When the genocide in Rwanda was imminent, Executive 
Outcomes26 drew up a business plan that could have had "armed troops on the 
ground within 14 days", at a cost of six hundred thousand US dollars a day.27 In the 
end the UN relief operation, which cost three million US dollars a day, came too late 
to save the many hundred thousand victims.28 In the words of Mr Beese of UK based 
Armorgroup, "if you want cost effective solutions to humanitarian emergencies and 
military overstretch, we're your guys".29 
 
                                            
19  Reuters Africa 2011 af.reuters.com. 
20  Brooks 2000/1 Conflict Trends 33. 
21  Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 76. 
22  The industry is also a windfall for unemployed ex-servicemen, who stand to earn easily ten times 
what local security guards are paid in Africa (IRIN 2008 www.irinnews.org). During the Executive 
Outcomes operation in Sierra Leone a soldier's salary ranged from US$ 2000 to US$ 13000 per 
month (Hough 2007 ASR 19). 
23  Hiring ex-army personnel from South Africa and Namibia is five or six times cheaper than 
employing Americans to do the same job, and Southeast Asia and Latin America also provide 
fertile grounds for hiring PSCs (Brooks 2000/1 Conflict Trends 34; IRIN 2008 www.irinnews.org). 
24  When Executive Outcomes were deployed in Sierra Leone their bill came to thirty-six million US 
dollars as compared with the UN's peacekeepers, which cost three million US dollars a day 
(Singer 2006 BJWA 111). 
25  Wright and Brooke 2007 ASR 108. 
26  Executive Outcomes is a private security firm which was based in South Africa and manned 
mostly by former South African Defence Force members. 
27  Singer 2006 BJWA 111. 
28  Singer 2006 BJWA 111. 
29  Carmola 2006 BJWA 170. 
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While some hail PSCs as the world's future peacekeepers30 acting as a "stabilising 
force",31 others challenge their legitimacy, maintaining that they are no more than the 
21st century's mercenaries, "recycled",32"repackaged",33 who come armed with a 
business model, "publicly listed companies",34 corporate websites, and slick 
corporate identities.35 Admittedly, the private security boom has motivated some 
previously mercenary-type operatives to re-invent themselves as supposedly 
legitimate private security companies.36 Whichever view one might hold, one thing is 
certain, the "existing international legal regimes" do not even "contemplate the 
existence" of PSCs, leaving PSCs in the "same grey area as the unlawful 
combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay".37 
 
Those who adhere to the view that PSCs are modern-day mercenaries would argue 
that we need only look to the two international treaties dealing with the eradication of 
mercenarism proposed by the United Nations38 and the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU),39 for guidance on how to approach the issue of PSCs. If this is a compelling 
position one would expect that the majority of states who are party to these two 
conventions would have domestic legislation in place regulating the activities of 
PSCs. Instead what we find is that only one (Italy) of the fifty-four states that have 
ratified either the UN Mercenary Convention or the OAU Mercenaries Convention 
has taken any steps at a domestic level to ban or regulate the activities of PSCs,40 
which we would argue supports the view that the label "mercenary" and its 
                                            
30  Lilly 2000 www.unidir.org 58. Cameron 2006 IRRC 863. 
31  Lytton 2006 Or Rev Int'l L 313. 
32  Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 77 and 91. 
33  Salzman 2008 Int'l L & Politics 876. 
34  Palomba 2009 www.e-IR.info 1. 
35  Singer 2006 BJWA 105; Abrisketa 2007 FRIDE Comment 2; Cullen 2000 Conflict Trends 36. 
36  Bjork and Jones 2005 TWQ. 
37  Singer 2006 BJWA 116; Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2637. 
38  UN Mercenary Convention; Fallah 2006 IRRC 603. 
39  The OAU Mercenary Convention entered into force in on 22 April 1985 and to date only 30 
Members of the African Union have ratified the convention. 
40  At the moment only South Africa and the United States (US) (two of the major suppliers of PSC 
personnel and management) have any domestic legislation aimed at PSCs (Frye 2005 Fordham 
L Rev 2645). The UK (another major source of PSCs) has drafted a Green paper but has yet to 
draft legislation on the subject. At the moment it appears the UK is favouring the regulatory 
framework which was adopted by the US (Walker and Whyte 2005 ICLQ 667).The other major 
suppliers of "management and operational personnel" for PSCs come from "France; Israel; 
Central and Eastern Europe", and as yet only Italy has passed domestic legislation aimed at 
regulating PSCs (Walker and Whyte 2005 ICLQ 651). 
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accompanying legal regimes are not particularly useful when dealing with the issue 
of PSCs.41 
 
South Africa has arguably the most aggressive regime of domestic legislation aimed 
at regulating the activities of PSCs, which is not surprising after it inadvertently found 
that it was a major exporter of PSCs42 in the post-apartheid era. The Regulation of 
Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 (hereafter the FMA) entered into force in 
1998 and was the government's hard-line response after Executive Outcomes made 
headlines around the world for their intervention in Sierra Leone in 1995. Eight years 
later, in response to concerns that the FMA was proving unworkable, the 
government promulgated the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of 
Certain Activities in the Country of Armed Conflict Act 27 of 2006 (hereafter the 
PMA). While the PMA received the necessary presidential assent in November 2007, 
over three years later it has yet to achieve the presidential proclamation necessary 
for the PMA to repeal the FMA and enter into force. 
 
South Africa appears to be alone in its mission to adopt such an aggressive stance 
towards regulating the private security industry. It is unlikely that a few pieces of 
domestic legislation, like those adopted by South Africa, will have any noticeable 
effect on the presence of PSCs as a feature of current and future armed conflicts. 
The unique situation posed by South Africa's legislation poses some interesting 
questions which we will explore. We begin by looking at the role played by PSCs in 
armed conflicts, and the status afforded them by international humanitarian law 
(IHL). We turn then to the issue of prohibited mercenarism, investigating if the 
actions of PSCs serve to group them with mercenaries (as defined by Additional 
Protocol I [AP I] and the two international Mercenary Conventions).43 We then shift 
our focus to the South African situation and discuss the ambit of application of both 
the FMA and its proposed successor, the PMA, exploring how these two pieces of 
legislation measure up to international law obligations regarding mercenarism. We 
discuss whether or not it is likely that the FMA and the proposed PMA might be 
successfully used to prosecute PSCs, and what penalties PSCs might face. Lastly 
                                            
41  Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2642. 
42  Holmqvist 2005 SIPRI 50. 
43  OAU Mercenary Convention and UN Mercenary Convention. 
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we consider the constitutional challenges which might emerge as the FMA, PMA and 
the proposed amendment to section 6 of the South African Citizenship Act (Bill B17 
of 2010)44 threaten the constitutionally protected rights of South African PSCs to 
practice a profession and enjoy citizenship. 
 
2  The international humanitarian law status of PSCs in armed conflicts45 
 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is the body of law applicable in situations of 
armed conflict.46 IHL classifies all those who find themselves in a situation of armed 
conflict into specific legal categories. Nobody who finds themselves in an armed 
conflict "can be outside of the law".47 They are either combatants (or authorised to 
accompany the armed forces), or they are civilians. There are many legal 
consequences which flow from this initial classification. Those labelled civilians, for 
example, are protected from the hostilities, provided they refrain from participating 
directly in the hostilities,48 while combatants are authorised to partake in hostilities 
and cannot be prosecuted for their participation (provided they observe the laws of 
war).49 With PSCs fast outnumbering traditional armed forces in present day armed 
conflicts there is an urgent need for IHL to address the question of their status and to 
assess their legal right to participate directly in hostilities.50 
  
While IHL treaties and international human rights law are binding on PSCs operating 
in situations of armed conflict,51 IHL as it stands makes no reference to PSCs as 
such. This leaves military commanders with the unenviable task of assessing the 
status of PSCs on a case-by-case basis, reaching conclusions based largely on the 
specific functions that the particular PSCs are performing.52 When one reviews the 
list of activities that PSCs have been hired to perform, it is clear that while PSCs are 
                                            
44  Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs 2010 www.pmg.org.za. 
45  For a more extensive discussion of the IHL status of PSCs see Bosch 2007 ASR. 
46  Fleck ″Introduction″ xi. 
47  Pictet Geneva Conventions 51. 
48  Gasser ″Protection of the Civilian Population″ 210. 
49  Ipsen ″Combatants and Non-combatants″ 80. 
50  Cameron 2006 IRRC 582. 
51  IHL is unusual in that it applies "to all individuals who find themselves in a territory in which there 
is an armed conflict (international or non-international), whether they are state or non-state 
actors" (Cameron 2007 www.baselgovernance.org; Singer 2006 BJWA 115; ICRC 2008 
www.icrc.org 39). 
52  ICRC 2008 www.icrc.org 14. 
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not typical uniformed combatants in the way that IHL understands that term, they are 
also not your regular civilians. When one considers that states make extensive use 
of PSCs, it is worth considering whether PSCs are effectively incorporated into the 
armed forces by way of contractual agreements.53  
 
In terms of IHL there is certainly no legal obstacle to a state's promulgating domestic 
legislation endorsing the incorporation of PSCs into the armed forces.54 All that IHL 
requires of states is that they ensure that these PSCs distinguish themselves from 
civilians, carry their arms openly, observe IHL, are subject to command responsibility 
and internal disciplinary systems, and that the opposition forces are notified of their 
incorporation.55 However, if one looks closely at state practice, it is evident that 
states do not consider commercial contracts, on their own, to be sufficient to 
incorporate PSCs into the ranks of the armed forces. In fact, the majority of states 
making use of PSCs go to great lengths to emphasise that they are merely civilian 
contractors, authorised to accompany the armed forces.56 Very often PSCs are hired 
precisely to circumvent "national laws that would prevent [states] from sending their 
own armed forces" into a conflict.57 Some writers suggest that the unspoken motive 
behind a state's use of PSCs to “do their dirty work” is the goal of avoiding "direct 
legal responsibility" for their actions.58 For the most part, then, while states that hire 
PSCs might be responsible for their actions, the PSCs themselves will not be able to 
claim IHL combatant status (as persons incorporated into the state's armed forces) 
                                            
53  Gillard suggests that the following factors might indicate affiliation to the armed forces of a state: 
"whether they have complied with national procedures for enlistment or conscription, where they 
exist; whether they are employees of the department of defence; whether they are subject to 
military discipline and justice; whether they form part of and are subject to the military chain of 
command and control; whether they form part of the military hierarchy; whether they have been 
issued with the identity cards envisaged by the Third Geneva Convention or other forms of 
identification similar to those of 'ordinary' members of the armed forces; and whether they wear 
uniforms" (Gillard 2006 IRRC 533). 
54  Gillard 2006 IRRC 534; Cameron 2007 www.baselgovernance.org 3; a 4A(2) Geneva 
Convention III (GC III). 
55  Article 4A(2) GC III; a 43(3) Additional Protocol I (AP I). 
56  Department of Defence 2005 www.dtic.mil. 
57  Cameron 2007 www.baselgovernance.org. 
58  Abrisketa 2007 FRIDE Comment 2. We would argue that if this is indeed their motivation, then 
these states have been ill advised, since state responsibility may be invoked as a result of the 
contract alone, giving rise to liability on the part of states hiring PSCs (Ipsen ″Combatants and 
Non-combatants″ 69; Cameron 2006 IRRC 584; Gillard 2006 IRRC 533 and ICRC 2008 
www.icrc.org 11). For a more detailed discussion of the issue of state responsibility see Bosch 
2008 CILSA; Gillard 2005 www.icrc.org 8. 
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because of the deliberate refusal by states to officially incorporate them into their 
armed forces. 
 
There is another category of personnel which IHL recognises and which, although 
not enjoying full combatant privilege, is nevertheless very closely aligned to the 
armed forces of a state, much as PSCs are contracted by states. This IHL category 
is termed "persons accompanying the armed forces".59 These personnel provide 
specialist expertise60 but are not fully fledged members of the armed forces, they do 
not wear uniform, they are not armed, and they are not permitted to engage in 
hostilities in any direct way.61 Within the category of "persons accompanying the 
armed forces" we find civilian members of military aircraft crews; war 
correspondents; supply contractors; reconstruction contractors; members of labour 
units; and those providing services for the welfare of the armed forces.62 Many of 
these functions are in fact being performed by today's PSCs. These essentially 
civilian contractors retain their civilian status, despite the fact that their assistance is 
used to win a military advantage over the opposition.63 Despite the fact that IHL 
views these "persons accompanying the armed forces" as civilians, they do enjoy 
one privilege normally reserved for the armed forces: that of prisoner of war (POW) 
status if detained for security reasons.64 For this reason "persons accompanying the 
armed forces" carry with them an identity card which confirms their status and POW 
privilege.65 While PSCs might be providing services similar to the services provided 
by those who traditionally accompany the armed forces, there are two obstacles to 
PSCs' claiming this IHL status. Firstly, PSCs do not carry the recognised 
identification cards reflecting this status, and secondly they would have to prove that 
their actions did not amount to direct participation in hostilities. A further difficulty for 
PSCs operating in armed conflicts of an internal nature is that this IHL category of 
"persons accompanying the armed forces" applies only to "international armed 
                                            
59  Article 4A(4) GC III; Walker and Whyte 2005 ICLQ 675. 
60  When one looks at the tasks normally performed by those accompanying the armed forces it is 
clear that the drafters of GC III did not intend to include in this group "persons carrying out 
activities that amount to direct participation in hostilities" (Gillard 2006 IRRC 537). 
61  Ipsen ″Combatants and Non-combatants″ 95. 
62  Article 4A(4) GC III. 
63  Parrish 2007 www.polisci.wisc.edu. 
64  Article 4A(4) GC III. 
65  Ipsen ″Combatants and Non-combatants″ 95; a 4A(4) and Annex IV A GC III. 
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conflicts". Moreover PSCs would need to provide their services to the armed forces, 
not merely the state, in order to qualify for this status.66 As for the issue of 
identification, it is accepted that when the Geneva Convention drafters included the 
provision regarding the identity card for those accompanying the armed forces it was 
agreed that  
 
possession of one was a supplementary safeguard for the person concerned, but 
not an indispensable prerequisite for being granted prisoner of war status.67 
 
Having said this, it is clear that where PSCs are directly participating in hostilities or 
where they are hired by non-state actors without any affiliation to the armed forces,68 
they will not be able to claim this IHL status. 
 
If PSCs are not incorporated into the armed forces or are unable to satisfy the 
requirement of "persons accompanying the armed forces" they will, by default, be 
classified as civilians. This default position is the result of a presumption that exists 
in IHL that where there is "doubt a person shall be considered to be a civilian".69 
Those PSCs who fall into this default position are subject to one very important 
restriction: with the exception of the levée en masse, civilians are not permitted to 
participate directly in hostilities.70 Provided they do not take part in the hostilities, 
PSCs are to be respected, shielded from attack, and may not be "taken prisoner 
without sufficient reason".71 Civilians who take an active part in hostilities, in violation 
of this prohibition, open themselves to attack from the opposition acting in self 
defence during and for such time as they continue to actively participate in 
hostilities.72 
 
It is "safe to conclude that the majority of PSCs hired by states" will fall into the IHL 
category of the ordinary citizen.73 Admittedly, PSCs are inherently a different 
category of civilian from those envisaged in the IHL conventions. They are clearly not 
                                            
66  ICRC 2008 www.icrc.org 36. 
67  Gillard 2006 IRRC 537. 
68  Cameron 2006 IRRC 593. 
69  Article 50(1) AP I, which defines a civilian as any person who is not a combatant. 
70  Gasser ″Protection of the Civilian Population″ 210; a 27(1) Geneva Convention IV (GC IV). 
71  Article 27(1) Geneva Convention I (GC I); a 51(2) AP I; a 13(2) Additional Protocol II (AP II). 
72  Article 51(8) AP I; ICRC 2008 www.icrc.org  14. 
73  Gillard 2005 www.icrc.org 6; ICRC 2008 www.icrc.org 36. 
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wholly innocent civilians going about their daily routine, caught in the crossfire. They 
have, after all, deliberately chosen to place themselves in the line of fire in an 
attempt to have an impact on the outcome of hostilities. PSCs are for the most part 
armed, a fact which begs the question: if they are essentially civilians, when are they 
permitted to use their weapons without being seen to be participating directly in 
hostilities? To this end, PSCs will need to familiarise themselves with the ICRC's 
Interpretive Guide74 as to what actions might amount to "direct participation in 
hostilities". Singer,75 in his research into PSCs, provides a helpful categorisation, 
using the analogy of a spear, to illustrate the various levels of involvement which 
PSCs might undertake in armed conflicts: 
 
At the tip of the spear are the "military provider firms that provide implementation 
and command services", in the mid section are the "military consultancy firms which 
provide advisory and training services", and lastly are the "military support firms 
which provide non-lethal aid and assistance".76 
 
Clearly the most problematic groups, in so far as the prohibition against direct 
participation in hostilities is concerned, are those that occupy the tip of the spear. At 
the tip of the spear we find those PSCs who are employed to undertake "targeted 
killings";77 operate high-tech weapons; or use computers to direct a weapon to strike 
a target remotely,78 and it has always been held that these actions amount to direct 
participation in hostilities79. The first conclusion we can draw then is that if PSCs are 
for the most part considered to be civilians, then whether or not they are found to be 
in violation of the prohibition against direct participation in hostilities will depend on 
the particular role which they play in the armed conflict. 
 
It is uncontroversial that IHL, as it stands at present, permits the use of civilian 
contractors in "a civil police role in occupied territory",80 and in carrying out this type 
of function PSCs "might be authorised to use force when absolutely necessary to 
                                            
74  ICRC 2009 www.icrc.org. 
75  Baker and Gumedze 2007 ASR 3. 
76  Baker and Gumedze 2007 ASR 3. 
77  Policy Brief 2008 www.hpcr.org 9. 
78  Cameron 2007 www.baselgovernance.org. 
79  Cameron 2007 www.baselgovernance.org. 
80  Elsea, Schwartz and Nakamura 2004 www.opencrs.com. 
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defend persons or property".81 Likewise, PSCs employed as guards for 
reconstruction companies would be entitled to use force in self defence and to 
"protect the facilities they are guarding, as long as they did so in a defensive manner 
and employed no more force than was strictly necessary".82 PSCs carrying out 
"support and logistical activities" which are normally carried out by civilians, like 
"catering, construction and maintenance of bases", will not be considered to be 
participating directly in hostilities.83 Similarly PSCs employed to conduct checkpoint 
searches would not violate the prohibition against direct participation in hostilities, 
provided they were not authorised to use a weapon.84 Moreover, both Faite85 and the 
ICRC's86 authoritative commentary conclude that "foreign advisers and military 
technicians" are never said to participate directly in hostilities. 
 
In some instances it will be the PSC's location that will determine his or her IHL 
status. So, for example, it is uncontroversial that PSCs carrying out civilian guarding 
duties at purely civilian sites or otherwise protected sites like schools, churches and 
hospitals could never be said to be participating directly in hostilities.87 The same will 
not be true of PSCs who position themselves at purely military objectives like an 
armoury or command centre belonging to the opposition forces.88 The presence of 
PSCs at a legitimate military target "aids the war effort and constitutes direct 
participation in hostilities".89 Much like workers in a munitions factory, while the 
civilian workers and guarding PSCs may not be personally targeted (because they 
retain their civilian protection from attack), the military objectives at which they are 
situated remain open to attack.90 IHL does not "draw a distinction between offensive 
or defensive operations". Consequently there is no guarantee of protection by 
claiming that the PSCs are merely performing guard duties. The truth of the matter is 
                                            
81  Elsea, Schwartz and Nakamura 2004 www.opencrs.com. 
82  Dworkin 2004 www.crimesofwar.org. What analysts have learnt from the conflict in Iraq is that "a 
situation can go from passive defence to active offence very quickly in an unstable environment", 
and the distinction between "combat and non-combat operations is often artificial" (FCO 2002 
www.fco.gov.uk para 10). Ipsen expresses the opinion that "technically armed security staff are 
civilians, like the contractors working with reconstruction" (Bjork and Jones TWQ 782). 
83  Cameron 2006 IRRC 588-589. 
84  Policy Brief 2008 www.hpcr.org 9. 
85  Faite 2008 www.icrc.org 4; Salzman 2008 Int'l L & Politics 882. 
86  Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann ICRC Commentary 579. 
87  Articles 51(1), 51(2) AP I; Faite 2008 www.icrc.org 8. 
88  Parrish 2007 www.polisci.wisc.edu 13; Human Rights Watch 2003 www.hrw.org. 
89  Parrish 2007 www.polisci.wisc.edu 13. 
90  Faite 2008 www.icrc.org 8. 
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that if they are deployed at a military objective they are participating in hostilities.91 
Having said that, a commander is always expected to be aware of the principle of 
proportionality in justification for an attack, and he or she should thus exercise 
greater caution if a site is inhabited predominantly by civilian PSCs.92  
 
If PSCs located at civilian sites are not considered to be participating in hostilities 
and PSCs located at military objectives are classified as participating in hostilities, 
what then of PSCs guarding dual-use sites like communications networks, power 
sources, oil refineries, transportation infrastructure (ports and airports), and the like - 
facilities which serve both the civilian population and the armed forces? In terms of 
IHL there is a clear presumption in favour of protected status for dual-use sites.93 
While that presumption persists it seems intuitively right that PSCs guarding dual-
use sites be afforded greater protection than those located at single-use military 
installations, in other words transferring the presumption of protected status (in 
respect of the site) to PSCs guarding the site and granting them civilian status until 
such time as the status of the installation can be determined to be offering any 
military advantage. To this end it would be useful if IHL drew some distinction 
between defensive and offensive guarding. At the moment AP I states only that an 
"attack means any act of violence…whether in offence of defence" (article 49(1)). 
This leaves PSCs who are defensively guarding dual-use sites in an unenviable 
position. In terms of IHL their defensive guarding would amount to an "attack" 
(thereby constituting unlawful direct participation in hostilities), whether the site is 
determined to be a military objective or not.94 
 
So, in terms of IHL, PSCs may, depending on their location and particular activities, 
be assigned differing status. For the most part PSCs will not be able to claim 
combatant status under IHL because of the deliberate refusal by states to officially 
incorporate them into their armed forces, although in law there is no legal obstacle to 
states passing legislation to incorporate PSCs into their traditional armed forces. As 
                                            
91  Gillard 2005 www.icrc.org 7. 
92  Human Rights Watch 2003 www.hrw.org; Oeter ″Methods and Means of Combat″ 163. 
93  Article 52 AP I states: "in case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian 
purposes, such as a place of worship, a house, or other dwelling or a school, is being used to 
make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used". 
94  Gillard 2006 IRRC 540. 
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for claims that they are similar to civilian contractors or "persons accompanying the 
armed forces", PSCs might be classified as such provided they could overcome the 
requirement of carrying a recognised identification card reflecting this status, and 
prove that they were not participating directly in hostilities. This option will not, 
however, be available to PSCs who are hired by non-state actors without any 
affiliation to the armed forces.95 As for claims that they are civilians, this would be 
sustainable provided they were only guarding civilian locations and refrained from 
any direct participation in hostilities. As soon as they are located at single-use 
military sites their presence at a legitimate military target would render them 
vulnerable to attack. Those PSCs found guarding dual-use sites would be afforded 
civilian status until such time as the status of the installation is deemed to offer any 
military advantage and for so long as they refrained from using force. 
 
3 PSCs: mercenaries by another name? 
 
When private security companies like Executive Outcomes undertake an assignment 
in mineral-rich territories and are paid by way of mining concessions, many 
commentators conclude that they are really just mercenaries by another name. In 
this section we aim to unpack the IHL and treaty law definition of a mercenary in the 
hope of either confirming or dismissing these claims. 
 
The oldest treaty reference to mercenaries can be found in the Hague Convention of 
190796 that was drafted in response to concerns that the activities of mercenaries 
would compromise the right of "post-colonial states to self determination".97 While 
Hague V does not criminalise mercenary activities, it does stipulate that neutral 
states are to refrain from assisting mercenaries or permitting the recruitment of 
mercenaries on their territory.98 Having said this, however, nothing in Hague V 
prohibits mercenaries from passing through a neutral state's territory.99 It was only in 
                                            
95  Cameron 2006 IRRC 593. 
96  Hague V. 
97  Fallah 2006 IRRC 599. In short the provisions in Hague V prevent the recruitment or organising 
of combatants in neutral territories (a 4), while permitting individuals to cross the border and offer 
their services to the belligerent party without negating that state's neutral status (a 6). 
98  Article 4 Hague V. 
99  Article 4 Hague V. 
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1977 that African delegates to the drafting negotiations of AP I championed the 
inclusion of article 47, which sought to deny mercenaries the privileges associated 
with lawful combatant status.100 The inclusion of article 47 was met with considerable 
resistance and some very influential states (most notably the US) refused to ratify AP 
I citing this very provision as its reason for not ratifying it.101 Some academics 
maintain that the poor state response to article 47 of AP I, alongside the poor 
ratification levels and very apathetic enforcement of the UN and OAU Mercenary 
Conventions,102 has led some to conclude that the conventions are indicative of 
"anti-customary law".103 Henckaerts104 concedes that while the definition of a 
mercenary (as set out in AP I article 47) is problematic, the principle that 
"mercenaries do not have the right to combatant or prisoner-of-war status" is 
considered to have achieved customary law status applicable in international armed 
conflicts. Whether it is considered custom or not, the application of AP I article 47 is 
certainly limited to international armed conflicts, leaving unanswered the issue of 
how one defines a mercenary in non-international armed conflicts.105 If controversy 
surrounds the customary status of provisions which prohibit mercenaries, how much 
more so can the case be made against the international criminalisation of PSCs106 
which, we contend, will probably not satisfy the definitional requirements of 
mercenary status. 
 
Despite UN General Assembly resolutions107 stating that "mercenaries are 
outlaws"108 and "punishable as criminals",109 and the 1970 General Assembly 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation amongst States, which claims that "states have a duty to refrain from 
                                            
100  Gaston 2008 Harv Int'l L J 232. 
101  Kwakwa 1990 HICLR 68. 
102  OAU Mercenary Convention and UN Mercenary Convention. 
103  Salzman 2008 Int'l L & Politics 878-879; Abrisketa 2007 FRIDE Comment 7; Zarate 1998 Stan J 
Int'l L 78, 120 and 134; Beyani and Lilly 2001 www.ssrnetwork.net 5. Noticeably absent from the 
UN Mercenary Convention is any substantial support from EU States (barring Italy and Belgium) 
and G8 states (barring Italy). 
104  Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 9 (eds) Customary International Humanitarian Law 108. 
105  Gillard 2006 IRRC 4. 
106  Salzman 2008 Int'l L & Politics 879. 
107  The Security Council has also on occasion issued resolutions aimed at specific incidents 
involving mercenaries in the 1960s, demanding "their immediate withdrawal" from foreign 
territories (SC Res. 289). 
108  GA Res 2625. 
109  GA Res 3103. 
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organising armed groups, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of 
another state",110 IHL has had little success in criminalising mercenary activities. To 
date mercenarism alone is still not a prosecutable offence under IHL. At best, 
mercenaries are denied combatant and POW status.111 For the most part this 
omission on the part of IHL can be attributed to the fact that the IHL definition of a 
"mercenary" is widely regarded as unworkable,112 "if not impossible".113 Even if the 
definition were workable, there are still no "monitoring or enforcement 
mechanisms…at the international law level" to police mercenary activities.114  
Moreover, mercenarism per se does not feature as a prosecutable offence under the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,115 unless the definition of 
aggression includes "some crime of mercenarism itself".116 This said, it must be 
remembered that all individuals, be they official armed forces, mercenaries, or PSCs 
are bound by the rules of IHL and can face individual criminal responsibility for war 
crimes.117 
 
At present IHL defines a mercenary 
 
as any person who (in the context of an international armed conflict): 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
                                            
110  GA Res 2625.  
111  Once individuals are identified as mercenaries they no longer have the right to claim combatant 
and prisoner of war status (a 47 AP I). Consequently they may not be immune from prosecution 
for participating in hostilities (as is the case with any civilian found participating directly in 
hostilities), and at best they can claim the minimum fundamental guarantees enshrined in a 75 
AP I (Fallah 2006 IRRC 606, Beyani and Lilly 2001 www.ssrnetwork.net 15). The Geneva 
Convention dealing with POW status (GC III) does not make any mention of mercenaries, a fact 
which has led to speculation that the convention drafters "intended to confer full POW status on 
mercenaries" (Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2526). 
112  Cameron 2007 www.baselgovernance.org and Cameron 2006 IRRC 578. Fallah cites the case of 
"Bob Denard who was convicted under French Law for 'belonging to a gang who conspired to 
commit a crime', for his part in aiding rebels to attempt a coup in the Comores Islands". A more 
mercenary act one can hardly imagine, and yet the anti-mercenary conventions were not utilised 
to effect a prosecution (Fallah 2006 IRRC 611). 
113  Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2637. 
114  Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2638. 
115  Fallah 2006 IRRC 610. Having said that, mercenary status can be used by the prosecution in 
arguing aggravating circumstances at the time of sentencing (Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2632). 
116  Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2632. It is common knowledge that the US concludes bilateral treaties 
with states where its soldiers operate to ensure their immunity from prosecution. What is more 
interesting is that the US sought this exception in respect of the PSCs operating in Afghanistan 
and Bosnia (Walker and Whyte 2005 ICLQ 687). 
117  Gillard 2006 IRRC 7. When news of the abuses at Abu-Ghraib broke, it was determined that 
PSCs (from CACI and Titan) had been hired to perform interrogations, yet the only prosecutions 
that resulted were in respect of US soldiers (Singer 2005 people.cas.sc.edu). 
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(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain 
and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material 
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of 
similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled 
by a Party to the conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as 
a member of its armed forces.118 
 
Given that all six criteria have to be fulfilled cumulatively, the threshold is difficult, if 
not impossible, to cross. If individuals could be shown to have satisfied all six criteria 
they might face prosecution, not for mercenarism per se, but for participating directly 
in hostilities without authorisation, much as civilians will face prosecution as unlawful 
combatants. 
 
These definitional difficulties are not peculiar to IHL. They have also beleaguered the 
two international treaties that deal with mercenarism: the UN Mercenary 
Convention119 and the OAU Mercenary Convention.120 In adopting substantially 
similar definitions, these conventions unwittingly took on board the problems which 
IHL had faced in dealing with mercenaries. The OAU Mercenary Convention was 
adopted in Libreville on 3 July 1977 and came into force on 22 April 1985. To date 
only thirty members of the African Union have ratified the convention. Four years 
later the UN adopted the UN Mercenary Convention, which took a further twelve 
years before it entered into force on 20 October 2001. To date it has been ratified or 
acceded to by only thirty-two countries. Notably absent are the Security Council's 
five permanent members and the world's major employers and suppliers of PSCs 
(the US, the UK and SA). Even at the drafting stage there was vehement resistance 
on the part of Western states to proposals that both AP I and the UN Mercenary 
Convention include penalties for states making use of mercenaries.121 
 
                                            
118  Article 47(2) AP I. 
119  UN Mercenary Convention. 
120  Infamously, the OAU Mercenary Convention failed to avert a coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea 
in 2004 largely due to its definitional difficulties (Gumedze 2007 ASR 22). 
121  Gaston 2008 Harv Int'l L J 232. 
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While the UN Mercenary Convention applies to all conflicts (both internal and 
international),122 which is an extension of AP I's international application, its definition 
excludes AP I's requirement (b), that the individual must in fact take part in 
hostilities.123 The UN Mercenary Convention includes within its ambit those who 
"attempt or recruit, use, finance or train individuals who fulfil these criteria as well as 
their accomplices".124 The net result is that "no state may use mercenaries under any 
circumstances" and captured mercenaries may be extradited under the 
convention.125 Rather surprisingly the UN Convention does not impose a  
 
total ban on mercenaries; it only prohibits those activities aimed at overthrowing a 
government, undermining the constitutional order of a state or undermining the 
territorial integrity of a state.126 
 
It seems that "it is the mercenary's fighting cause that seems to matter to the UN, not 
the mercenary as a fighter".127 Without any real "monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms" it is not surprising that as yet no one has ever faced prosecution 
pursuant to the convention.128 Even in the few instances where there were relatively 
clear cases of mercenary activity (like the coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea), those 
prosecuting the violations chose to charge the accused individuals with firearms and 
immigration violations129 rather than mercenarism per se. Perhaps it is more 
alarming still that states who are party to the convention (like Congo-Brazaville, 
DRC, Nigeria, Angola, and most recently Libya) have either made use of 
mercenaries or "permitted or benefited from mercenary trade since ratifying the UN 
Mercenary Convention",130 reinforcing the academic opinion that the convention is 
actually indicative of "anti customary law".131 
 
                                            
122  Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2630. 
123  Fallah 2006 IRRC 609. 
124  Articles 2, 3 UN Mercenary Convention. 
125  Article 10 UN Mercenary Convention. 
126  Articles 1(2)(a)(i) and (ii) UN Mercenary Convention; Beyani and Lilly 2001 www.ssrnetwork.net 
24. 
127  Kritsiotis 1998 Fletcher F World Aff 14. 
128  Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2642. 
129  Clapham 2006 IRRC 513. 
130  Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2642.  
131  Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2642, Abrisketa 2007 FRIDE Comment 7. 
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As for the OAU Mercenary Convention, it mimics the IHL definition of a mercenary as 
set out in AP I, save for the fact that the compensation promised need not be in 
excess of that paid ordinary combatants (as set out in AP I article 47 (2)(c)). 
"Monetary gain of any amount" is sufficient under the OAU Mercenary Convention.132 
The scope of application of the OAU Mercenary Convention is limited to "those 
fighting against a process of self determination, stability or the territorial integrity of 
another [OAU] state".133 This leaves the door open to AU states to use "mercenaries" 
in other capacities (i.e. "in internal conflicts or to violate the sovereignty of non-
member states").134 Like the UN Mercenary Convention, "the recruitment, use, 
financing and training of mercenaries" are prosecutable offences, provided the states 
party to the convention have implemented domestic legislation to this effect.135 On 
the whole, the Convention's obligations have been largely ignored by AU states who 
are party to the convention136 with none having promulgated legislation, despite the 
fact that it was African states who pressed for the inclusion of article 47 in AP I.137  
 
However problematic these definitions of a "mercenary" might be, they nevertheless 
remain the international benchmark for assessing the behaviour of those PSCs 
accused of mercenarism. Certainly up until 2004, when Shaista Shameem replaced 
Enrique Bernales-Ballesteros as the UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenarism,138 the 
official position of the Special Rapporteur's office was that PSCs were 
mercenaries,139 a finding that the majority of the international community chose to 
reject.140 If one looks at the lax application by signatory states to PSCs of the two 
anti-mercenary conventions, coupled with the fact that PSCs operate in over fifty 
                                            
132  Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2630. 
133  Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2630. 
134  Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2639 and 2643; aa 1, 6 OAU Mercenary Convention. 
135  Cameron 2007 www.baselgovernance.org; Fallah 2006 IRRC 608. 
136  Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2643. The UN Convention does in fact make it a crime to be a 
mercenary, but enforcement requires states party to the convention to legislate so as to make 
prosecutions possible (aa 3, 7 and 9). So unless there is domestic legislation (which at present 
only Italy has promulgated) in place, as there is in South Africa, it is unlikely that any PSCs 
engaging in mercenary activities will be prosecuted under the domestic laws of a detaining state 
which is party to either of the two anti-mercenary treaties. 
137  Gaston 2008 Harv Int'l L J 232. 
138  An office created in 1987 by the UN Commission on Human Rights. 
139  UN Report 1997. Despite having said that, the report does concede that PSCs seem to "fall 
outside the prohibitions of international treaties and national laws banning the use of 
mercenaries" (Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 145). 
140
 
 Cameron 2006 IRRC 575. 
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states, often on government contracts,141 one gets a very particular picture. State 
practice and opinio juris suggest that under customary international law PSCs are 
not considered mercenaries for want of state practice.142 International opinion seems 
to suggest that there are significant reasons for treating PSCs and mercenaries 
differently.143  
 
While neither the OAU Mercenary Convention nor the UN Mercenary Convention 
mentions PSCs, the UN is seeking  
 
support towards an additional protocol to the Convention to address newer forms of 
mercenarism such as the activities of private military and security companies.144  
 
Whether such a protocol will ever see the light of day is doubtful, as for the most 
part, those states making use of PSCs and those in which PSCs operate favour the 
drive towards the regulation of PSCs rather than outright prohibition.145 States seem 
to want to keep their options open in case the need for PSCs arises.146 In fact, in 
2005 the Swiss government together with the ICRC began a drive towards promoting 
greater respect of IHL and international human rights law on the part of PSCs, 
lending credibility to the position that PSCs are not as a general rule regarded as 
mercenaries.147 As a result of this initiative, the thirty-five participating states,148 
NGOs, academics and industry stakeholders supported the Montreux Document149 
(a set of best practices and regulatory options) after a plenary session in September 
2008. The Montreaux initiative has been endorsed by the HRC's "Report of the 
Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and 
impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self determination".150 In the working 
group's report it is recommended that states establish a national register of military 
and security companies, and that member states define which types of activity in the 
                                            
141  Gaston 2008 Harv Int'l L J 224. 
142  Singer 2004 CJTL 533; Gaston 2008 Harv Int'l L J 241.  
143  Gaston 2008 Harv Int'l L J 241. 
144
  
Jacobs 2008 Strateg Rev S Afr 4. 
145  Gaston 2008 Harv Int'l L J 242. 
146  Cullen 2000 Conflict Trends 37. 
147  Gillard 2006 IRRC 527. 
148  Included here are the UK, France, China, Australia, Canada, Germany, USA, Italy, Uganda, 
Sierra Leone and surprisingly South Africa, amongst others. 
149  ICRC 2008 www.icrc.org. 
150  GA HRC. 
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military and security field can and cannot be outsourced by the state to the private 
sector.151 Of course there are those that say that private security companies are only 
pursuing the path of self regulation to "boost consumer confidence".152 Whatever 
their motivation, it would seem that at present there is just not the legal or political 
will on the part of states (both weak and strong) to implement "tough legislation" on 
PSCs.153 In this regard the legislation aimed at PSCs introduced by South Africa is 
the clear exception. 
 
Not only does state practice and opinio juris suggest that PSCs should not be 
labelled mercenaries, but in many ways PSCs fail to fulfill the six criteria required by 
the international definition of a mercenary. The first requirement for mercenarism is 
that PSCs must be "specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed 
conflict".154 When one considers that many PSCs are contracted to work for a period 
of time rather than for a specific engagement,155 they will not satisfy this requirement 
as under the existing IHL regime "a combatant will only be considered a mercenary if 
he is hired for a specific and finite engagement".156 Moreover most PSCs are not 
recruited to fight but are contracted to provide advice; training; logistical support; or 
to act as bodyguards. This view is endorsed by the ICRC's commentary on the AP I, 
which states that military advice, training, and technical maintenance of weapons are 
not "mercenary activities" and do not in and of themselves amount to direct 
participation in hostilities.157 Moreover, there is doubt that the term "armed conflict" in 
this clause of the definition, as it was lifted from article 47 of the AP I and transposed 
into the two Mercenary Conventions, applies to internal conflicts. Since the AP I 
applies only to international conflicts and the OAU and UN Mercenary Conventions 
do not explicitly define the term, this leaves doubt that the OAU and UN Conventions 
intended their definition also to apply to internal conflicts.158 There is certainly a good 
case to be made for the contention that the first requirement will be satisfied only if 
PSCs are recruited specifically to fight in particular international armed conflicts.  
                                            
151  GA HRC 18-19. 
152  Carmola 2006 BJWA 164. 
153  Cullen 2000 Conflict Trends 37, 39. 
154  Article 47(2)(a) AP I. 
155  Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2657; Salzman 2008 Int'l L & Politics 881. 
156  Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2638. 
157  Major 1992 GJICL 103. Sandoz ″Private Security and International Law″ 209. 
158  Gumedze 2007 ASR 24. 
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The second definitional requirement demands that PSCs must "in fact, take a direct 
part in the hostilities".159 In none of the relevant treaties is there an explanation of 
what activities might constitute direct participation in hostilities. In 2009 the ICRC 
published an Interpretive Guide160 on how to interpret this phrase. From our 
discussion above we would argue that PSCs could use force in self defence and to 
"protect the facilities they are guarding" without falling foul of the prohibition on direct 
participation.161 Similarly PSCs hired to perform "catering; construction and 
maintenance of bases";162 unarmed checkpoint searches;163 or to act as "foreign 
advisers and military technicians"164 are never said to participate directly in 
hostilities.165 From the discussions above we would conclude that only when PSCs 
are located at single-use military sites; are employed to undertake "targeted 
killings";166 are employed to operate high-tech weapons systems; or use computers 
to direct a weapon to strike a target remotely,167 can they be said to be participating 
directly in hostilities.168 As for the rest, those playing a "supportive or defensive role" 
would retain their civilian status.169 
 
The third requirement is that PSCs must be motivated purely by excessive material 
compensation.170 It is widely accepted that PSCs are earning in excess of their 
military counterparts. PSCs employed in Iraq or Afghanistan can earn in the region of 
                                            
159  It is interesting that the UN Mercenary Convention omits this requirement, which seems to 
suggest that any involvement in an armed conflict, even if it doesn't rise to the level of direct 
participation in hostilities would constitute mercenary behaviour (Fallah 2006 IRRC 609). This 
means that while PSCs might escape the mercenary label in terms of IHL and the OAU 
Convention, it would be easier to classify them as mercenaries under the UN Convention (that is, 
provided they satisfy the remaining requirements cumulatively). 
160  ICRC 2009 www.icrc.org. 
161  Dworkin 2004 www.crimesofwar.org. 
162  Cameron 2006 IRRC 588-589. 
163  Policy Brief 2008 www.hpcr.org 9. 
164  Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 123. 
165  Faite 2008 www.icrc.org  4, Salzman 2008 Int'l L & Politics 882; Sandoz, Swinarski and 
Zimmermann ICRC Commentary 579. 
166  Policy Brief 2008 www.hpcr.org 9. 
167  Cameron 2007 www.baselgovernance.org. 
168  Gillard 2006 IRRC 6. 
169  Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann ICRC 57. Zarate suggests that the term mercenary "should 
not be applied to security contractors that are hired by legitimate governments, or by 
internationally recognised movements of national liberation for either training or combat support" 
(Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 80). 
170  In terms of the OAU Mercenary Convention any compensation will be sufficient. It need not be 
excessive. 
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US$100 000 to US$200 000171 a year, compared to US$50 000 base pay for a Navy 
Seal or Green Beret counterpart.172 Having said that, however, there are some who 
argue that those UN member states who contribute to UN peacekeeping forces (aka 
"disguised mercenaries")173 also "do so largely for financial reasons".174 This leaves 
many academics questioning what kind of legal proof of such motivation would 
satisfy a court of law.175 Others suggest that international law needs to develop 
further to deal with foreign fighters whose motivation is monetary as well as 
ideological, the so-called "confessional mercenaries".176 All things considered, this 
leaves us questioning to what extent PSCs would fall foul of this definitional criterion. 
To our minds this is probably the one criterion that PSCs might easily satisfy 
(especially in the case of the OAU Mercenary Convention, which requires only 
compensation, not necessarily excessive compensation.)177 However, as the six 
criteria are cumulative, PSCs would still escape being categorised as mercenaries 
provided they did not satisfy the other five criteria. 
 
The fourth requirement is an exemption of sorts for all PSCs who are nationals of a 
party to the conflict, or residents of a territory controlled by a party to the conflict. 
Paradoxically PSCs emanating from states party to the conflict (for example the US 
or UK in the case of Iraq) would automatically be exempt from mercenary status 
under the fourth criterion,178 while fellow employees of the same private security 
company would not enjoy this exemption as a result of their citizenship or residence 
alone. It seems that a very easy way round this requirement is for contracting firms 
to invite foreign PSCs to take up residence in a state party to the conflict prior to their 
deployment to the conflict zone, thereby affording them the right to claim this 
residency exemption. 
 
                                            
171  Salzman 2008 Int'l L & Politics 885 cites figures of US$ 20 000 a month for PSCs deployed in 
Iraq. 
172  Lytton 2006 Or Rev Int'l L 334. With figures like this being bandied about it is no wonder that the 
special forces of the US and UK are experiencing a "brain drain" (Salzman 2008 Int'l L & Politics 
885). 
173  Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2615-2616. 
174  Member states who contribute soldiers to a UN operation could earn $988 per month, per soldier 
(Fountain 2005 Mich St J Int'l L 243). 
175  Diplock Report para 7; Fallah 2006 IRRC 605, Gumedze 2007 ASR 27. 
176  For example the Arab fighters employed by the Taliban (Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2637). 
177  Article 1 OAU Mercenary Convention. 
178  Gumedze 2007 ASR 28, Faite 2008 www.icrc.org 4. 
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The fifth requirement, like the fourth, operates as an exemption for all PSCs who are 
members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict. As already discussed in some 
detail above, the likelihood of PSCs being incorporated into a state's armed forces is 
remote,179 although not completely without precedent.180 Gillard181 suggests that the 
following indicators might be used to argue that PSCs have been incorporated into 
the state's armed forces: where there is a national law stipulating such incorporation; 
where PSCs are employed by the department of defence; where PSCs are subject to 
military disciplinary structures/a chain of command/a military hierarchy; or where 
PSCs wear uniforms or carry identity cards as envisaged by GC III. In most cases, 
however, given the reticence of states to officially incorporate PSCs into their armed 
forces, the majority of PSCs will not be able to rely on this exemption to escape 
mercenary status. 
 
The final exemption available to PSCs seeking to avoid mercenary status comes into 
effect if they can show that they have "been sent by a State which is not a Party to 
the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces".182 This last exemption 
extends the previous criteria (of incorporation into the armed forces) to those who 
are sent by a state which is not party to the armed conflict. Some would argue that 
where a state has contracted PSCs (although not officially incorporating them into 
their armed forces) the contract of employment is sufficient to conclude that they are 
contractors of the employing state183 and entitled to claim this exemption. Ironically, 
an individual hired by a humanitarian NGO to assist with the delivery of civilian relief 
aid would not be able to claim this exemption, despite his or her laudable motives 
and IHL-endorsed mandate.184 
 
In conclusion then, while it seems in theory possible for a PSC (in the context of an 
international armed conflict) to fulfill all of the requirements of the IHL definition of a 
                                            
179  Gillard 2005 www.icrc.org 5. 
180  This was in fact the case for Sandline in Papua New Guinea in 1997 and Executive Outcomes in 
Sierra Leone (Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2641; Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 124). In the case of 
Sandline they were granted the status of "special constables" under the laws of Papua New 
Guinea so that they could carry out their functions (Cullen 2000 Conflict Trends 38.) 
181  Gillard 2005 www.icrc.org 5. 
182  Article 47(2) AP I. 
183  Maogoto and Sheehy 2006 Bepress Legal Series 20; Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2646. 
184  Gumedze 2007 ASR 29. 
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mercenary, this would be unlikely. Moreover, provided PSCs refrain from any direct 
participation in hostilities, their activities will also not be "prohibited by recognised 
international norms".185 In the final analysis, PSCs will most likely be labelled 
civilians or "persons accompanying the armed forces". The infamous quote from 
Geoffrey Best regarding mercenaries is even more applicable to the situation of 
PSCs: 
 
the definition of a mercenary in these instruments is so unworkable and riddled with 
loopholes that any mercenary who cannot exclude himself from this definition 
deserves to be shot – and his lawyer with him.186  
 
Some have argued that the difficulties plaguing the international law definition of a 
mercenary have been of assistance to the private security industry, leaving PSCs in 
a "sort of legal limbo",187 rather than giving PSCs pause to consider the legality of 
their actions. To be fair, the provisions prohibiting mercenaries were never drafted 
with PSCs in mind, and this is especially true when those PSCs are employed by 
"recognised regimes"188 and by those very states and regional organisations which 
had spearheaded the IHL anti-mercenary provisions.189 If this is the legal situation in 
terms of IHL and international treaty law dealing with mercenaries, it is perplexing 
that South Africa has taken such an aggressive stance towards PSCs, particularly 
when other PSC supplier states are favouring a move towards regulation rather than 
outright prohibition. The effect of the FMA and its intended successor (the PMA) is to 
make the highly skilled ex-apartheid army personnel (who are mostly white) persona 
non grata inside our borders.  
 
                                            
185  Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 117. 
186  Best Humanity in Warfare 374. 
187  Abrisketa 2007 FRIDE Comment 7. 
188  Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 117. 
189  Both Nigeria and Angola have employed the services of PSCs and even the OAU has 
considered employing Executive Outcomes for peacekeeping missions in Africa (Zarate 1998 
Stan J Int'l L 117). 
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4 South Africa's anti-mercenary legislation in the light of the international 
law approach to mercenaries190 
 
Only a small number of states have taken steps to enact domestic legislation 
specifically aimed at regulating the PSC industry within their territory.191 Many of 
these instances of regulation have come about to end a state's reputation for being a 
recruiting ground for "dogs of war" eager to participate in dirty conflicts, coup 
attempts, and human rights abuses.192 In an era which witnessed the South African-
based Executive Outcomes and Logo Logistics heavy involvement in conflict 
situations in Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe, it is not surprising that 
the South African government busied itself with drafting the Regulation of Foreign 
Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 (FMA), which entered into force on 18 September 
1998, and remains applicable to date. The FMA was "the first of its type in the 
world",193 and is widely regarded as adopting "unquestionably…the most hard-line 
'anti-mercenary' stance in the international sphere".194 What is particularly interesting 
is that South Africa should choose to adopt such a tough approach on PSCs when it 
is party to neither the OAU nor the UN Mercenary Conventions.195 Its domestic 
legislation exceeds the international law obligations set out in either of the anti-
mercenary conventions.196 
 
                                            
190  The authors are indebted to Adv Max Du Plessis for affording us access to the Ex Parte 
submissions made to the president on behalf of a South African Private Security Company 
providing security services in Iraq. 
191  The French Penal Code criminalises mercenary activity and prescribes sanctions of up to five 
years imprisonment or a fine of 75 000 Euros. In terms of Italian Penal Law a number of offences 
are criminalised, including the participation of any person in an armed conflict of a state in which 
he/she does not reside or have relating citizenship. Switzerland's Penal Code prohibits Swiss 
nationals from participating in foreign military service without the approval of the Swiss Federal 
Council. Under Sierra Leone's National Security and Central Intelligence Act 10 of 2002 the 
granting of licenses to companies that are used to provide security services are regulated by 
government. The United States of America have several pieces of legislation applicable to PSCs, 
including the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 2000, the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations, 1979 and the Arms Export Control Act 22 USC 2778. 
192  Gillard 2006 IRRC 528; Drury 2009 www.dailymail.co.uk. 
193  IRIN 2008 www.itinnew.org.  
194  Baker and Gumedze 2007 ASR 4. 
195  Singer 2006 BJWA 105; Abrisketa 2007 FRIDE Comment 2; Cullen 2000 Conflict Trends 36; 
Bjork and Jones 2005 TWQ. 
196  Jacobs 2008 Strateg Rev S Afr 4. 
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The FMA prohibits the recruitment, use, training or financing of mercenary 
activities,197 and defines mercenary activity as the "direct participation as a 
combatant in armed conflict for private gain".198 This mirrors closely the type of 
conduct prohibited under AP I and the two Mercenary Conventions.199 The FMA, 
however, goes further and also prohibits the rendering of any foreign military 
assistance200 without prior authorisation from the National Conventional Arms 
Control Committee (NCACC).201 Under the FMA, the term "foreign military 
assistance" includes within its ambit a range of activities including providing military 
assistance to a party to an armed conflict, and providing security services for the 
protection of individuals involved in armed conflict or their property. Excluded from 
the parameters of "foreign military assistance" are humanitarian or civilian activities 
aimed at relieving the plight of civilians in an area of armed conflict.202 Any person 
guilty of rendering foreign military assistance without the necessary permission or 
who fails to observe the conditions203 attached to that permission will be guilty of an 
offence and liable to a fine or a period of imprisonment or both.204 
 
The South African approach to the PSC industry is markedly different from the 
response which PSCs have received from other governments. Britain, for example, 
has adopted an approach that "recognises the industry's positive and legitimate role 
globally, as well as the graphic extent of arenas in which PMCs operate".205 Britain 
has consequently set out options for the regulation of PSCs in a Green Paper and 
the British government is currently considering a way forward based on the 
responses to the Green Paper.206 In the USA the provision of military/defence 
                                            
197  Section 2 Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 (FMA). 
198  Section 1(iv) FMA. 
199  The UN Mercenary Convention and the OAU Mercenary Convention. 
200  Section 3 FMA. 
201  A person who wishes to engage in foreign military assistance has to make an application to the 
NCACC (s 4(1) or 5(1)). The committee will then consider the application and make a 
recommendation to the Minister of Defence on whether to accept or reject the application (s 4(2) 
or 5(3)). The Minister may then refuse or grant the application subject to certain conditions. The 
Minister may also at any time withdraw or amend any such authorisation (s 4(3)). 
202  Section 1(iii) FMA. 
203  Also see s 8(1). The FMA does not prescribe a maximum fine or maximum period of 
imprisonment for offences. 
204  Section 8(1) FMA. 
205  FCO 2009 www.fco.gov.uk 5. 
206  Gomez del Prado 2008 www.law.wisc.edu. 
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services is regulated by the US Arms Export Control Act.207 The US legislation 
defines "defence services" to include the provision of military advice and the training 
of foreign units and forces,208 thereby covering the tasks often performed by PSCs. 
Furthermore, the United States Department of Defence has issued directives209 that 
apply to contractors and their employees, including all non-US personnel who are 
employed by these contractors and who may have authorisation to accompany the 
US armed forces, once again a common practice in the PSC industry. Furthermore, 
the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act210 establishes federal jurisdiction over 
offences committed by any person employed by or accompanying the US armed 
forces committed outside the United States, potentially bringing PSCs squarely 
within the US courts' jurisdiction regardless of the fact that they might be foreign 
nationals and have committed their offences outside of US territory. However, owing 
to some definitional ambiguities this Act has been successfully utilised only once, to 
prosecute a contractor who was found with child pornography at the Abu Ghraib 
prison in Iraq.211 Most recently, in 2007, following the alleged abuses at Abu Ghraib, 
the scope of the Uniform Code of Military Justice212 was extended to include PSCs, 
and strictly prohibits any form of cruelty or oppression of prisoners.213 The US 
legislators have chosen to monitor and regulate the activities of PSCs while in Sierra 
Leone, private security companies are required to undergo an assessment before 
they are granted a licence214 to provide "security services" in terms of the National 
Security and Central Intelligence Act 10 of 2002.215 At most a company might face 
the revocation of its licence, but once the licence has been granted there are no 
further duties or penalties placed upon PSCs.216 Belgian legislation, promulgated in 
                                            
207  Arms Export Control Act 22 USC 2778. This act is implemented through the International Traffic 
in Arms Regulations 1976 (as amended); Gomez del Prado 2008 www.law.wisc.edu. 
208  FCO 2002 www.fco.gov.uk. 
209  These directives inter alia authorise third-country nationals and host nation personnel to 
accompany US Armed Forces. See for instance Department of Defence Directive 2311.01E of 9 
May 2006 (as amended) and Department of Defence 2005 www.dtic.mil. 
210  Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (Public Law 106-523). 
211  Gomez del Prado 2008 www.law.wisc.edu. 
212  Uniform Code of Military Justice US Code Title 10 Subtitle A Part II Chapter 47. 
213  Uniform Code of Military Justice US Code Title 10 Subtitle A Part II Chapter 47. 
214  Foreign firms who would like to make use of Sierra Leonean employees must submit their 
request to the Ministry of Labour, which will provide them with suitable personnel (Gomez del 
Prado 2008 www.law.wisc.edu 19). 
215  In this act, security services are defined as "such services connected with the security of the 
State as the National Security Council may determine" (Part I para 1, Part V para 19(9) National 
Security and Central Intelligence Act 10 of 2002); Gomez del Prado 2008 www.law.wisc.edu 19. 
216  Gomez del Prado 2008 www.law.wisc.edu 19. 
S BOSCH AND M MARITZ                                                       PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
98 / 261 
 
2003, penalises217 the recruitment of any persons with the intent of serving in a 
foreign army in the territory of a foreign state, but does not prohibit law enforcement 
operations authorised by public law organisations to which Belgium is a party.218 No 
other state has adopted the hard-line approach towards PSCs which characterises 
the South African legislation - not even other states which are prolific suppliers of 
PSCs. 
 
It is not surprising that the efficacy of South Africa's FMA has been undermined by 
"its lack of support by other international actors, notably the US and UK".219 Without 
their support South Africa has managed to prosecute only a handful of PSCs, 
despite there being an estimated 2000 to 4000 South African citizens working as 
PSCs in Iraq.220 Academics speculate that the legislation is likely "to push the 
industry underground", with PSCs more likely to opt for a change in citizenship in 
order to avoid prosecution.221 Already the legislation has forced Executive Outcomes 
to move its operations outside South Africa's borders, although this has not stopped 
it recruiting South Africans for work in Sierra Leone and Angola.222  
 
After only a few high profile prosecutions it became clear that the FMA was flawed, 
and this led to the Department of Defence rushing through its replacement Act, the 
Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of 
Armed Conflict Act 27 of 2006 (hereinafter the PMA). The PMA received Presidential 
assent in November 2007, but has yet to receive the necessary presidential 
proclamation and regulations to make it law. Under the PMA 
 
2(1) No person may within the Republic or elsewhere -  
(a) Participate as a combatant for private gain in an armed conflict; 
(b) Directly or indirectly recruit, use, train, support or finance a combatant for private 
gain in an armed conflict; 
(c) Directly or indirectly participate in any manner in the initiation, causing or 
furthering of  
(i) An armed conflict; 
(ii) A coup d'etat, uprising or rebellion against any government; or 
                                            
217  With a maximum of a two-year prison term. 
218  Gomez del Prado 2008 www.law.wisc.edu 14. 
219  Gaston 2008 Harv Int'l L J 241. 
220  Gaston 2008 Harv Int'l L J 241; Hodge 2006 www.slate.com. 
221  IRIN 2008 www.irinnews.org. 
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(d) Directly or indirectly perform any act aimed at overthrowing a government or 
undermining the constitutional order, sovereignty or territorial integrity of a state.223 
 
Much like the FMA, the PMA provides that all forms of foreign military assistance224 
must be authorised225 if provided to a party to an armed conflict, or in a regulated 
country.226 Not only does the NCACC have the authority to attach conditions227 to its 
authorisation of any foreign military assistance, but section 9 of the PMA sets out a 
broad set of grounds upon which the NCACC can draw to justify its refusal of such 
authorisation. It can refuse authorisation if foreign military assistance: 
 
(a) is in conflict with the Republic's obligations in terms of international law; 
(b) would result in the infringement of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the territory where the assistance or service is to be rendered or the exemption 
granted; 
(c) endangers the peace by introducing destabilising military capabilities into the 
region or territory where the assistance or service, or humanitarian aid, is or is likely 
to be, provided or rendered; 
(d) would contribute to regional instability or negatively influence the balance of 
power in such region or territory; 
(e) in any manner supports or encourages any terrorist activity or terrorist and 
related activities, as defined in section 1 of the Protection of Constitutional 
Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, 2004 (Act No 33 of 2004); 
(f) contributes to the escalation of regional conflicts; 
(g) in any manner initiates, causes or furthers an armed conflict, or a coup d'etat, 
uprising or rebellion against a government; or 
(h) prejudices the Republic's national or international interests. 
 
What is of particular concern, from an administrative law perspective, is that the 
wording of section 9 will make it extremely easy for the NCACC to deny an applicant 
the required authorisation, thereby infringing his or her constitutional right to practise 
a profession, without even granting him or her a hearing. Furthermore, neither the 
FMA nor the PMA provides any guidelines to the NCACC on how the conditions 
                                            
223  Section 2 FMA. 
224  The activities that form part of the provision of foreign military assistance are set out in s 3 
Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in the Country of Armed 
Conflict Act 27 of 2006 (PMA). 
225  A person seeking such authorisation must submit an application to the NCACC, which considers 
the application and may refuse it or grant the application subject to such conditions as it may 
determine, or at any time withdraw or amend an authorisation already granted (s 7(2) PMA). 
226  The NCACC can inform the National Executive that it is of the opinion that an armed conflict 
exists or is imminent in any country, and that it is of the opinion that such a country should be 
proclaimed as a regulated country. The President may then, by proclamation in the Government 
Gazette, proclaim any country as a regulated country for the purposes of the PMA (ss 6(1), 6(2)). 
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referred to in section 7(2) should be determined.228 Even more worrying is the 
possibility that at any time the NCACC may withdraw or amend its authorisation,229 
exposing individuals to potential prosecution. 
 
The net effect for South African citizens employed as PSCs is that their opportunities 
to seek employment abroad rest entirely in the hands of the NCACC, which not only 
has the power to designate the "regulated countries" but also has the right to refuse 
applications to provide foreign military assistance, or to set conditions for such 
permission and retract authorisation at any time. This leaves South African PSCs in 
the unenviable position of being potentially liable for prosecution for actions that IHL 
and anti-mercenary treaties do not prohibit, solely because of their citizenship. 
Moreover, their potential employers now perceive South African PSCs as a liability 
rather than an asset, given the bureaucratic demands, indeterminant conditions, and 
the looming possibility that authorisation can be retracted mid-contract.230 South 
African PSCs who are already enlisted in the armed forces of another country or 
employed as PSCs by foreign companies would be well advised to accept the 
citizenship or residency of that country in order to avoid the risk of prosecution by 
virtue of their South African citizenship.231 
 
5 Challenges facing the prosecution of PSCs under the FMA and future 
PMA 
 
It did not take many attempted prosecutions in terms of the FMA for the Minister of 
Defence to realise that the legislation was flawed.232 Richard Rouget was the first 
man to be charged under the FMA for "recruiting mercenaries for the conflict in the 
Ivory Coast". 233 Rouget pleaded guilty to recruiting persons for military assistance, 
which included logistical support and the provision of equipment, and was fined 
R100 000 for contravening the FMA. On appeal the fine was reduced to R75 000 by 
                                            
228  Sections 4(3), 5(3) PMA. 
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230  Jacobs 2008 Strateg Rev S Afr 11. 
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the Pretoria High Court.234 In February 2004 Carl Alberts was arrested for alleged 
mercenary activities in the Ivory Coast. Alberts was sentenced to two years in jail or 
a fine of R20 000. However, after entering a plea bargain agreement with the 
National Prosecuting Authority his jail time was suspended and in the end Alberts 
only paid a fine of R10 000.235 In March 2004, only one month after Alberts had been 
arrested, the now infamous coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea started unfolding. 
Sixty-two South African citizens who were implicated in the alleged plot to overthrow 
the government of Equatorial Guinea were returned to South Africa in 2005 after 
spending a year in Zimbabwe's Chikurubi prison for immigration offences.236 Upon 
their return to South Africa eight of these men were charged with violating the 
FMA.237 Crause Steyl pleaded guilty to "participating in a conspiracy to execute a 
coup" in Equatorial Guinea and was fined R200 000 or ten years imprisonment with 
a further five years suspended for five years.238 Louwrens Horn and Hermanus 
Carelse undertook to assist the NPA in further investigations and as a result of a 
plea bargain were each fined R75 000. Sir Mark Thatcher (who is by far the most 
prominent prosecution thus far under the FMA)239 pleaded guilty on a lesser charge, 
admitting that his actions may have recklessly contributed to the financing of the 
coup plot. He was ordered to pay a fine of R3 million and received a four-year 
suspended sentence.240 The remaining eight accused were subject to a full 
prosecution in terms of the FMA (a rare occurrence)241 and all eight were 
acquitted242 on the ground that the charges could not be proved.243 
 
If one looks over the history of attempted prosecutions under the FMA it is evident 
that the FMA has never been thoroughly applied by the courts.244 Instead the NPA 
has in most cases opted for plea bargain agreements. It is telling that there has yet 
                                            
234  Recently Rouget was alleged to be active in Iraq, a clear indication that his punishment under the 
FMA did not serve as a proper deterrent (Taljaard ″Implementing South Africa's FMA″ 175). 
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to be a successful prosecution on the facts in terms of the FMA without a plea 
bargain which resulted in a guilty verdict. Some cite the potential for serious 
constitutional challenges to the FMA as the reason for all of the prosecutions ending 
in plea bargains and fines, with little or no jail time.245 Another interesting observation 
flowing from these attempted prosecutions is that all of the prosecutions under the 
FMA have been reserved for genuine mercenaries and coup plotters. To date no 
persons participating in what could be classified as non-mercenary security services 
have faced prosecution under the FMA. It is likely that the same difficulties regarding 
constitutional challenges will plague any prosecutions under the PMA if it were to be 
rigidly applied to PSCs. If the track record of prosecutions under the FMA is anything 
to go by, PSCs providing non-mercenary support services abroad are likely to 
escape prosecution, as the NPA seems to focus on traditional mercenaries and coup 
plotters. Although by law any PSCs engaged in unauthorised foreign military 
assistance are liable for prosecution, it is unlikely that the NPA will be successful in 
prosecuting the large number of South African citizens working abroad in this field - 
that is, not without first overcoming some damning constitutional challenges to its 
legislation. 
 
For those South African PSCs providing peaceful support services in conflict-torn 
regions, there is a strong case to be made that their activities (which are not 
criminalised under international law) are being unfairly criminalised under this 
domestic legislation.246 Not only is there no international law obligation upon South 
Africa to criminalise the actions of PSCs (provided they are not acting as 
mercenaries), but as we have already shown, the international community as a 
whole is overwhelmingly in favour of regulating rather than outlawing PSCs. The far-
reaching impact of the FMA will potentially have the effect of criminalising activities 
that were perfectly legal in the territories where they were being committed, solely 
because they were committed by South African citizens, permanent South African 
residents, or South African juristic persons. Moreover, foreign nationals who seek to 
recruit PSCs on South African soil without the NCACC's authorisation could find 
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themselves in difficulty with the law.247 These provisions have already sent South 
African private security companies scampering to reinvent themselves as 
corporations incorporated under foreign law and located anywhere but on South 
African soil in order to avoid being targeted by this legislation. Moreover, South 
Africa has no obligation in international law to regulate the activities of South African 
nationals on foreign soil, or foreign nationals on South African soil, so long as their 
actions fall short of the international obligations to prohibit mercenary activities, and it 
seems clear that as international law stands at the moment PSCs are not necessarily 
classified as mercenaries.248 In fact, even in terms of the OAU Mercenary 
Convention, African states are still permitted to hire non-nationals to perform security 
functions, although as it stands OAU members would be well advised to avoid 
recruiting South African nationals, residents or juristic persons, and certainly not to 
carry out any recruiting on South African soil.  
 
Another possible avenue for challenging the FMA (and its successor the PMA) lies in 
administrative law. In terms of the FMA and the PMA any authorisation to offer 
foreign military assistance has to come from the NCACC. The legislation lists several 
grounds upon which the NCACC must refuse an application to offer foreign military 
assistance.249 The difficulty which faces the NCACC in carrying out this 
administrative function is that these factors are broadly stated, extensive in their 
scope, and couched in vague terms, making it almost impossible for a potential 
applicant to assess the likelihood of being granted the required authorisation. South 
African administrative law demands that while the discretionary powers ascribed to a 
body (like the NCACC) may be broadly formulated, the factors relevant to the 
exercise of such discretionary powers must be indisputably clear.250 This is not the 
case with section 7 of the FMA or section 3 of the PMA. What is indisputably clear is 
that these vague grounds for refusing an application for authorisation will almost 
always provide a means of justifying the refusal of any application which the NCACC 
disapproves of, especially where that disapproval is motivated by private political 
agendas. If, as we predict, authorisation will in most instances be denied, the onus 
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rests on the individual PSCs to request reasons from the NCACC in terms of the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (hereafter PAJA).251 However, as correctly 
pointed out by Du Plessis252 in his Ex Parte submission to the president, any 
meaningful decision regarding an application for authorisation can be taken only 
after an extensive evaluation process. To this end, true administrative justice could 
be achieved only if each applicant were permitted to make representations to 
convince the NCACC that his application would not infringe any of the grounds set 
out in section 9 of the Bill. Regretfully this audience with the NCACC is not granted 
by the legislation at the time when the application is under consideration. This leaves 
an unsuccessful applicant burdened unnecessarily with having to rely on PAJA and 
the courts to challenge unfair administrative decisions. Where PSCs are sought on 
short notice to respond to an unfolding humanitarian disaster (post conflict), the 
bureaucratic delay in getting the necessary NCACC authorisation as a result of the 
over-reaching impact of the legislation will almost always mean that non-South 
African citizens will be favoured. 
 
With the potential for the NCACC to readily deny authorisation, or at least to force 
PSCs to make use of PAJA to challenge an unsuccessful application, comes the real 
concern that these decisions by the NCACC will necessarily impact negatively on the 
individual PSC's right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely as set out 
in section 22 of the Constitution.253 In terms of the Constitution, a South African 
citizen's choice of trade, occupation or profession may be regulated only by a law 
that is reasonable and justifiable and rationally connected to a legitimate government 
purpose.254 Unfortunately the implementation of the FMA (and soon the PMA) will 
potentially prohibit a whole range of noble activities which are currently carried out by 
PSCs. The vague terms in which the legislation is couched might deny authorisation 
to both the traditional "mercenary" and the PSCs who are employed to guard 
vulnerable NGOs providing humanitarian assistance in war-torn regions. Likewise, 
the PSCs who are involved in legitimate de-mining operations in war-torn regions 
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might be tarred with the same brush as the coup plotters. These potentially absurd 
consequences speak to the vague, arbitrary, unreasonable and unjustifiable manner 
in which the FMA and future PMA impact on the constitutional rights of PSCs. 
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how prohibiting their assistance in projects aimed 
at restoring human rights and ameliorating civilian suffering can be connected to any 
legitimate government purpose. Rather, it is widely recognised that civilian security 
services and humanitarian assistance training are essential for post-conflict 
reconstruction, and may be vital to protect and restore human rights in countries 
affected by conflict. 
 
The FMA, and its successor the PMA face a myriad of constitutional, administrative 
law and international law challenges should they ever be actively pursued in a court, 
rather than being used to coerce plea bargains, as has been the experience to date. 
Perhaps these obstacles have catalysed the newest initiative (in terms of 
amendments to the South African Citizenship Act)255 planned by the government to 
eradicate the problem of the politically embarrassing yet burgeoning South African 
private security industry. 
 
6 Denying Citizenship to PSCs: enforcing the FMA and future PMA 
through other avenues 
 
In 2010 the South African government announced a proposed amendment to section 
6256 of the South African Citizenship Act.257 The proposal permits the government to 
revoke the citizenship of any South African serving in a foreign military for "engaging 
in a war under the flag of a country that the Government of South Africa does not 
support".258 The concept of a "foreign military" is not defined in the Bill, but could 
conceivably apply to South African PSCs who are contracted to assist the armed 
forces of a foreign state.259 According to the Department of Home Affairs Director 
                                            
255  South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995. 
256  South African Citizenship Amendment Bill B[17-2010]. 
257  The South African Citizenship Amendment Act will add subsection (c) to the already existing s 6 
of the South African Citizenship Act. 
258  DefenceWeb 2010 www.defenceweb.co.za. 
259  This bill would, however, not have any effect on South African PSCs who are not serving in a 
foreign military. 
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General, Mkuslei Apleni, this amendment is aimed only at naturalised South African 
citizens (i.e. immigrants), but there is nothing in the proposed amendment which 
shows that these provisions will not also be applied to non-immigrant citizens.260 The 
potential consequences for this proposed amendment could have far-reaching 
effects for many PSCs currently serving abroad under contracts to foreign armies. It 
is not clear which specific conflicts will attain the status of a war that "the 
Government of the Republic does not support". So, for example, a South African 
citizen employed as a PSC in Palestine acting as a bodyguard to Israeli government 
officials might find himself not only sought for prosecution under the FMA, but facing 
the revocation of his South African citizenship. As a result of the potential fall-out 
from this proposed amendment, Paul Boateng, in his capacity as High Commissioner 
for the UK Foreign Office, lobbied the South African government to ensure that the 
800 plus South Africans who are part of the British army were not forced to renounce 
their South African citizenship.261 The ANC government rejected the petition, stating 
that such a provision would "create loopholes allowing South Africans not only to join 
foreign armies but also become mercenaries with companies such as Aegis”.262 We 
wait with bated breath to see what will become of the proposed bill, which has 
already drawn condemnation from the private security industry and legal academics 
alike. 
 
Given the poor track record of successful prosecutions of PSCs under the FMA and 
the likelihood that its successor the PMA will face the same legal difficulties, it seems 
that this new initiative aimed at PSCs is simply a new way for South Africa to rid itself 
of its pesky international reputation as a fertile hunting ground for those seeking 
"guns for hire". 
 
                                            
260  DefenceWeb 2010 www.defenceweb.co.za. 
261  Drury 2009 www.dailymail.co.uk. 
262  Paul Boateng quit his position as a British MP to become a director of Aegis Defence Services 
(at the centre of the "arms to Sierra Leone" scandal in 1998) (Oliver 2009 
www.timesonline.co.uk). 
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7 Conclusion 
 
One of the unique features which differentiate present-day armed conflicts from their 
predecessors is the pivotal role played by PSCs. We feel it is imperative to analyse 
the role played by PSCs in armed conflicts and begin to theorise how IHL might 
respond to this new animal. To this end we have argued that those few PSCs who 
are officially incorporated into the armed forces of a state should enjoy primary 
combatant status, although state practice shows that this is an unlikely occurrence. 
In instances where PSCs are contracted by states to assist their armed forces and 
provide non-lethal services, we propose that they be categorised with those "persons 
accompanying the armed forces" for the purposes of IHL. As for the rest, we 
conclude that they will be categorised as civilians, and provided they do not 
participate directly in hostilities and restrict their activities to defensive263 guarding of 
civilian sites, they cannot be targeted or labelled as unlawful belligerents. 
 
There is a great deal of public sentiment, fuelled by media reports of coup attempts, 
which has, perhaps unfairly, seen all PSCs labelled as mercenaries. Our exploration 
of both IHL and the two Mercenary Conventions reveals that while it seems in theory 
possible for a PSC (in the context of an international armed conflict) to fulfill all of the 
requirements of the IHL definition of a mercenary, this is unlikely. Consequently we 
conclude that the label “mercenary” is not particularly useful in devising a legal 
regime that can deal with the presence of PSCs in modern armed conflicts. 
 
Within this legal framework it is perplexing that South African legislation has taken 
such an aggressive stance towards PSCs. The aggressive overreaching legislation 
has vested the NCACC with very broad grounds upon which to refuse, retract or set 
restrictive conditions for any PSC seeking authorisation to work abroad. Not only are 
these requirements particularly onerous for South African PSCs, but they are not 
                                            
263 Some academics like Schmitt (Schmitt 2004 Chi J Int'l L 541 and Schmitt 2005 Chi J Int'l L 529) 
argue that any participation in hostilities (offensive or defensive) strips PSCs of their essentially 
civilian status and renders them unlawful belligerents. We have argued that a more nuanced 
analysis might allow for PSCs to retain their civilian status provided they limit their participation to 
the defence of purely civilian targets. PSCs who engage in offensive activities on the other hand, 
are clearly unlawful combatants, may be targeted and could face prosecution for their unlawful 
behaviour. 
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practised by any other state, nor are they required by any international legal 
obligation. The net effect is to unreasonably and unjustifiably limit the constitutional 
right of PSCs to practise their profession, and to force South African citizens to 
denounce their citizenship in order to avoid prosecution. The FMA, and its successor 
the PMA, face a myriad of constitutional, administrative law and international law 
challenges should they ever be actively pursued in a court. We hope that debating 
these issues will give government pause to consider the impact of its existing 
legislation and expose the planned amendments to the South African Citizenship Act 
for what they really are – a backdoor means by which to deny the constitutional 
rights of the South African PSC. 
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